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The enhancement debate in neuroscience and biomedical ethics tends to focus on the
augmentation of certain capacities or functions: memory, learning, attention, and the like.
Typically, the point of contention is whether these augmentative enhancements should
be considered permissible for individuals with no particular “medical” disadvantage along
any of the dimensions of interest. Less frequently addressed in the literature, however, is
the fact that sometimes the diminishment of a capacity or function, under the right set
of circumstances, could plausibly contribute to an individual’s overall well-being: more is
not always better, and sometimes less is more. Such cases may be especially likely, we
suggest, when trade-offs in our modern environment have shifted since the environment
of evolutionary adaptation. In this article, we introduce the notion of “diminishment as
enhancement” and go on to defend a welfarist conception of enhancement. We show
how this conception resolves a number of definitional ambiguities in the enhancement
literature, and we suggest that it can provide a useful framework for thinking about the
use of emerging neurotechnologies to promote human flourishing.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in neuroscience and related fields have allowed for an
unprecedented increase in our ability to intervene in brain-level
processes, thereby influencing a wide range of higher-order func-
tions and behaviors. As Nagel (2010) has noted, this growing and
ever more finely-tuned capacity to tamper with even normally-
functioning neural systems raises a number of ethical questions
about the boundary between traditional research/clinical prac-
tice and outright human enhancement. “[A] societal climate of
performance measurements and improvements,” Nagel writes,
has led to a “growing tendency to use medical and technologi-
cal means beyond their applications in classical therapy” (p. 1).
Hence, even though “most of these technologies are developed
for medical or research purposes, their application for [human]
enhancement interventions is at hand” (ibid.).
Aburgeoningacademic literaturehasbegun todebate themoral
propriety of such enhancement. This debate often centers on the
useofneurotechnological,pharmacological,orother interventions
to increase some human capacity or function (e.g., Bostrom, 2003,
2009; Bostrom and Roache, 2008; see also Daniels, 2000; Harris,
2007; and Kass, 2003a; especially pp. 12–13). What, after all, is the
meaning of “enhance” if not to heighten, to augment, to intensify?
Thuswe see articles askingwhethernon-invasive brain stimulation
should be used to enhance learning (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2012); whether we should be worried about university students
taking Ritalin to improve focus (e.g., Outram, 2010); whether
doctors have an obligation to ingest ergogenic drugs to stay awake
during late-night surgery (e.g., Greely et al., 2008); and whether
the use of mood brighteners is getting out of hand (e.g., Farah,
2002). The “augmentative” flavor of much of this work can be
seen in a recent article by Dees (2007, p. 372):
[Now or in the near future] drugs may be able to improve our abil-
ity to think. Amphetamines can help people to learn skilled motor
tasks, like playing the piano, more rapidly. Cholinsterase inhibitors
now help [patients] to improve their attention and memory, and
better versions may help virtually anyone. Amphetamines, like
Ritalin, improve focus, attention, and memory... Some drugs may
help the formation of long-term memories and thereby facilitate
learning... [Drugs can also] alter people’s moods.... Soon drugs
almost certainly will be developed that will “brighten” the mood
of anyone who takes them.
Bostrom and Roache (2008) take a similar approach: “One impor-
tant way in which the human condition could be changed is
through the enhancement of basic human capacities... There are
various ways in which we can currently improve [these capacities,
including] stamina, strength, dexterity, flexibility, coordination,
agility, and conditioning” (pages 1 and 7 1). In another paper,
Bostrom (2009, p. 82) asks us to
1Page numbers are from the online version available at http://www.
nickbostrom.com/ethics/human-enhancement.pdf
2Page number is from the online version available at http://www.
nickbostrom.com/ethics/dignity-enhancement.pdf
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Consider, for example, enhancements in executive function and
self-control, concentration, or of our ability to cope with stressful
situations; further, consider enhancements of mental energy that
would make us more capable of independent initiative and that
would reduce our reliance on external stimuli such as television;
consider perhaps also enhancement of our ability to withstand
mild pains and discomforts, and to more effectively self-regulate
our consumption of food, exercise, and sleep.
Note the specific focus here on capacities, moods, or functions
that might be improved by the pharmacological (or other)
intervention—“improved” in the sense of facilitating more of
whatever it is that the function normally does (see Dresler et al.,
2013 for a recent review).We can summarize this sort of approach
as follows:
The Functional-Augmentative Approach to Enhancement:
Interventions are considered enhancements insofar as they
improve some capacity or function (such as cognition, vision,
hearing, alertness) by increasing the ability of the function to
do what it normally does.
The debate then typically turns on whether the proposed
capacity-enhancement should be considered permissible for
someone who does not suffer a “medical” disadvantage along
that dimension (Daniels, 2000; Allhoff et al., 2009). In this con-
text, a distinction is frequently drawn between “enhancement”
(on the one hand) and mere “treatment” or “therapy” (on the
other), with the implication often being that the former may
be morally problematic in ways that the latter may not be.
This consideration suggests a second approach to understanding
enhancement:
TheNot-MedicineApproach to Enhancement (Treatment vs.
Enhancement) (see, e.g., Sabin and Daniels, 1994; Juengst,
1998; Daniels, 2000; Kass, 2003b; Pellegrino, 2004): On this
view, “the term enhancement [characterizes] interventions
designed to improve human form or functioning beyond what
is necessary to sustain or restore good health” (Juengst, 1998,
emphasis added).
There are other approaches as well. In an earlier work, we iden-
tified two additional ways of understanding enhancement—the
sociological-pragmatic approach and the ideological approach
(see Savulescu et al., 2011, for details)—and then proceeded to
outline a new account of enhancement, which we argued was
preferable to the others: the welfarist approach. This approach can
be defined as follows:
The Welfarist Approach to Enhancement: “Enhancement”
should be defined to mean any change in the biology or psy-
chology of a person which increases the chances of leading a
good life in a given set of circumstances.
In the present article, we wish to develop our defense of
this welfarist account by contrasting it specifically with the
“augmentative” functionalist approach 3 (i.e., enhancement of
some capacity; see Table 1 for a selective summary)—as well as
the related “not-medicine” approach to enhancement—in light
of recent discussions in neuroethics that seem to break the con-
ventional mold. We introduce the notion of “diminishment as
enhancement” and focus on a set of cases in which “subtractive”
interventions—that is, interventions geared toward weakening a
given capacity or function—might plausibly contribute to indi-
vidual welfare enhancement in line with the definition just laid
out. We conclude by discussing some of the advantages that this
welfarist conception has over other common definitions.
DISCUSSION
What do we mean by “diminishment”? We can dispense with a
potential red herring. We do not mean to draw attention to spe-
cific neural pathways or low-level mechanisms whose weakening
or disruption might go on to yield some higher-order functional
outcome. For instance, stimulants such as Ritalin, sometimes
used to augment focus and concentration, could in principle be
understood as “diminishments” since—on at least at one level of
description—they actually limit the reuptake of neurotransmit-
ters, ultimately producing their stimulating effects 4 . Likewise,
TMS and other forms of brain stimulation may involve disrupting
3Onemay wonder just how common this approach is—that is, how frequently
it is encountered in the literature compared to other approaches. As noted
above, in addition to the work of prominent figures such as Bostrom—who
define enhancement explicitly in terms of augmentation of functions or capac-
ities (see especially Bostrom, 2009)—the most commonly referenced account
is the “not-medicine” approach, which distinguishes enhancement from treat-
ment, as in the seminal report from the President’s Council on Bioethics,
“Beyond Therapy” (Kass, 2003b). “Therapy” is ordinarily understood as being
an attempt to address disease, which on the dominant account after Boorse
(1977) is species-typical subfunctioning (see also Daniels, 1985). Therefore,
on the “not-medicine” approach as well, enhancement just is the improve-
ment of some function within (or beyond) the normal range. We do not
suggest, of course, that the functional-augmentative view is the only view
one encounters in the literature, nor that cases of functional diminishment
are never employed in these debates. Indeed, one of the classic examples of
“enhancement” from the field—the blunting of painful memories (which we
discuss below)—is quite common. However, in our reading of the literature, it
is examples relating to capacity augmentation that are much more frequently
encountered and actually used as illustrations of enhancement; and when
instances of diminishment are raised, their specific implications for the con-
ceptual understanding of enhancement is rarely if ever addressed. In addition,
the link between the intervention (whether augmentative or diminishing) and
well-being is not commonly articulated as such, with other goals such as “self
improvement” being either stated or implicitly assumed (e.g., Farah, 2013).
4Though note, as a reviewer points out: diminishment-as-enhancement “can
work at both lower (neurobiological) and higher (mental, psychological) lev-
els in a complementary way [depending upon the way the enhancement is
described]. While methylphenidate produces its stimulating effect by limit-
ing the reuptake of dopamine, it enhances one’s capacity to be more attentive
to and focused on a particular task by diminishing the content and scope
of one’s attention” (emphasis added). Thus we can see that it is possible to
augment (via diminishment) a given capacity (here, focus), not only by inter-
fering with some lower-order neurological process, but even by diminishing
an inversely related higher-order capacity: in this example, the scope of one’s
attention. Therefore it is important to make clear (as we do in a subsequent
paragraph) that our emphasis in this paper is on interventions that would
diminish the targeted higher-order capacity itself (i.e., focus), rather than
either (a) some lower-order mechanism whose diminishment would actually
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Table 1 | Selective summary of “augmentative” neural enhancements, means, and references.
Function Means References
Attention Nicotine, Modafinil, caffeine, glucose, aerobic
exercise, rTMS, computer training, meditation
Benton et al., 1994; Hilgetag et al., 2001;
Rezvani and Levin, 2001; Newhouse et al.,
2004; Repantis et al., 2010; Smith et al.,
2010; Chiesa et al., 2011; Zelinski et al., 2011
Empathy and mind-reading Oxytocin, MDMA Bartz et al., 2010; Hysek et al., 2012
Executive function Aerobic exercise; computer training;
meditation
Smith et al., 2010; Chiesa et al., 2011;
Nouchi et al., 2012
Learning—including implicit learning,
verbal learning, and numerical
learning
Amphetamine, methylphenidate, a large
number of synaptic-plasticity affecting drugs,
tDCS, various memory arts and mnemonic
systems
Soetens et al., 1993; Clark et al., 1999;
Kincses et al., 2004; Williams and Eskandar,
2006; Lee and Silva, 2009; Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2010; Repantis et al., 2010; Javadi
et al., 2012; Suthana et al., 2012
Inhibitory control and self control Modafinil, Atomoxetine, glucose Turner et al., 2003; Galliot et al., 2007;
Chamberlain et al., 2009
Memory—including working
memory, memory encoding, and
memory consolidation
Glucose, donepezil, physiostigmine, exercise,
tDCS, Ampakines, Modafinil, methylphenidate,
computer training, protein, meditation
Elliott and Sahakian, 1997; Furey et al., 2000;
Lynch, 2002; Turner et al., 2003; Barch,
2004; Marshall et al., 2004; Fregni et al.,
2005; Luber et al., 2007; Jaeggi et al., 2008;
Ohn et al., 2008; Riby et al., 2008; Thorell
et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Chiesa et al.,
2011; Teo et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012
Planning Methylphenidate Elliott and Sahakian, 1997
Reaction speed Glucose Owens and Benton, 1994
Recall tDCS Gagnon et al., 2010; Ross et al., 2010
Wakefulness/alertness Caffeine, Modafinil, amphetamine, other
stimulants
Hartmann and Cravens, 1976; Smith, 2002;
Baranski et al., 2004
activity in one region as ameans to enhancing function in another
(or at another level of description). For example, TMS can reduce
interference between similar-sounding words in phonological
memory (likely by disrupting the phonological store), thereby
improving verbal recall (Kirschen et al., 2006). In these sorts of
cases, it is the higher-order function itself that we take to be the
target of enhancement (i.e., the capacity for focus, concentra-
tion, or recollection), whereas the lower-order “diminishment” is
merely instrumental.
By contrast, we intend to highlight interventions that serve to
diminish the higher-order capacities themselves. That is, we want
to focus on interventions that make concentration (for exam-
ple) worse—by virtue of whatever neural mechanism is involved.
Consider some illustrative cases. Should soldiers be given propra-
nolol to reduce the emotional intensity of wartimememories (e.g.,
Henry et al., 2007)? Should a battered spouse use “anti-love” neu-
rotechnology to sever the emotional attachment she has with her
increase the target capacity, or (b) an inversely-related higher-order capacity,
whose diminishment would have a similar effect.
abuser (Earp et al., 2013)? Should sex offenders have to undergo
“chemical castration” as a condition of parole (e.g., Gupta, 2012)?
Should appetite suppressants be developed for mass-market con-
sumption (e.g., Farah, 2013)? These are just a few recent examples
of potential interventions that might reduce or diminish a higher-
order capacity.
Interventions of this kind raise many of the same patterns
of ethical concern as the more conventional cases of functional
enhancement typically encountered in the bioethics literature.
For example: who should administer the drug or apply the tech-
nology? Should the intervention be regulated? How? Is a threat to
autonomy or authenticity potentially implied? And what sort of
externalities might need to be anticipated?
At the same time, however—given a functional-augmentative
framework—these cases might seem puzzling or out of place.
They seem puzzling because they apparently involve the very
opposite of enhancement, namely, diminishment: i.e., dimin-
ishment of wartime memories; diminishment of harmful love;
diminishment of ill-directed lust, and so on. How might these
seemingly opposite-to-enhancement outcomes be made to square
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with the seemingly similar-to-enhancement applicability of “stan-
dard” bioethical analysis?
There is a straightforward solution to this puzzle. Sometimes,
diminishment is enhancement—on the welfarist definition of the
term (see above). That is, once we shift our focus from the partic-
ular capacity or function being modified to the overall normative
goal of the modification itself, we begin to see that “enhance-
ment” may be more broadly understood as having something to
do with well-being—a goal that the welfarist definition makes
explicit. On this account, in order for an intervention to count as
an enhancement, it does not matter if the capacity itself is being
modified “up” or being modified “down.” Nor does it matter if
the modification is being accomplished by means 5 of a drug, a
biochip, an electrical brain-stimulator, or something more famil-
iar and lower tech. Nor does it matter if the intervention is called
“medicine” or “therapy” or “beyond therapy” or anything else. If
it increases the person’s chances of leading a good life in the rele-
vant circumstances, then we propose that it should be considered
an enhancement.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT
Well... so what? What does this welfarist definition get us? How
will it be useful for medical professionals, neuroethicists, and
other stakeholders engaged in these sorts of discussions? Finally,
what advantages does it have over other definitions used through-
out the literature?
First, and most basically, it acknowledges that “more” is
not always “better.” As commonplace a maxim as this is, it is
not always duly appreciated. As the neuroscientist Baron-Cohen
(2011) has recently argued, even such “obviously” beneficial
human capacities as the ability to empathize may have mal-
adaptive consequences in certain cases. For example, too much
empathy might drive a person to prioritize attending to others’
feelings over meeting her own basic needs. Or consider “empathy
fatigue”—a term used by Stebnicki (2007) to refer to the phys-
ical and emotional exhaustion that grief and trauma counselors
sometimes come to face: their inability to distance themselves
emotionally from the pain and suffering of their clients ultimately
prevents them from doing their job. Likewise,Williams (1989) has
hypothesized that among helping professionals, high emotional
empathizers may be disposed to earlier career burnout.
The same lesson may apply to other “obviously” beneficial
capacities such as intelligence or IQ. While super-intelligence
might seem to be an enviable trait or disposition, being “too smart
for one’s own good” is not always a mere teasing admonition: for
many intellectually gifted individuals, very high intelligence can
come at a direct cost to their overall well-being (Harrison and
Van Haneghan, 2011). Furthermore, intelligence is not sufficient
5Note that the means “do not matter” only in the specific sense stated—i.e., in
terms of whether some intervention should be counted as an enhancement. By
contrast, the means might very well matter in terms of having different safety
profiles, etc. Furthermore, there is no reason to think that all means will be
normatively equivalent either, even if well-being is taken as the explicit goal of
enhancement. This is because there are other normatively-relevant consider-
ations besides well-being, such as justice or fairness, which may impact upon
the evaluation of means (as well as other factors related to enhancement), as
we discuss in a later section.
for achieving the good life, but is merely instrumental, and IQ
enhancement per se does not seem to have any clearly determinate
value (Tännsjö, 2009).
Likewise, the ability to remember well would seem to be a ben-
eficial thing: “memory makes us” (it has been said) and many
elderly people are very sad to see their powers of recollection fade
over time. But as any victim of rape might tell you—and as the
soldiers we referred to earlier would hasten to agree—sometimes
memory can be a devastating shackle. In addition, research has
shown that excessive autobiographical memory (hyperthymesia)
can interfere with the basic business of living one’s life (Parker
et al., 2006).
Finally, even romantic love—undoubtedly the most cele-
brated emotional capacity of all—can be dangerous or even life-
threatening when the object of affection is cruel or abusive. Some
victims of domestic violence, for example, find themselves unable
to diminish their passionate feelings for their abuser, despite being
fully aware that their long-term well-being and even basic phys-
ical safety may be under threat by remaining in the relationship
(Earp et al., 2013, 2014, under review; see also Earp et al., 2012,
for further discussion).
The implication in all of this is clear; and here we reaffirm our
thesis to drive it home: Sometimes, diminishing a certain capacity
or function—under the right set of circumstances—could quite
plausibly enhance a person’s overall well-being.6
SOME FINE-TUNING
Given this possibility, one might be tempted to argue that func-
tional diminishment would only enhance well-being by bringing
the individual back from a pathological state to a species-typical
state. Yet while this direction of change could reasonably describe
a number of specific cases, it is unlikely to hold as a general rule.
This is because what it is that enhances well-being is not species-
general, but rather context-specific. Thus, as Dees (2007) notes,
“beta blockers [can be used to] decrease stress and nervousness,
and so they help even normal people cope with abnormal sit-
uations” (p. 372). In the context of a public performance, for
example, even a quite ordinary stress reaction could interfere with
an individual’s well-being, given the context-local goals of the per-
former: hence “[the] widespread use [of beta-blockers] among
concert performers is legendary” (ibid.) Likewise, in the noto-
rious “Ashley case” (Liao et al., 2007), the parents of a severely
brain-impaired child wanted to stunt her growth by using estro-
gen therapy (as well as remove her uterus and breast buds) in
order to improve her quality of life. While parts of the treatment
and even the motivations behind it may certainly be called into
question, it is at least plausible to think that reducing Ashley’s
growth, all things considered, would count in favor of her own
best interests. For example, Ashley’s parents suggested that her
smaller size would make it easier to carry her around, thus allow-
ing her to participate more fully in the activities of daily living.
If so, then approaching the normal human size range would not
improve well-being, whereas the proposed diminishment might.
6This sort of welfare enhancement is likeliest to occur, we suggest, when
the functional diminishment in question results in optimal levels of capacity
functioning for successful adaptation to the demands of the environment.
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But what is the more general thrust of the argument? In other
words, when, or under what conditions, is (functional) dimin-
ishment likely to produce (well-being) enhancement? We have
already discussed context-specific and “pathological” cases, but
others suggest themselves as well. One plausible view is that we
should expect promising enhancers when the trade-offs in our
living conditions have shifted from the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptation (Bostrom and Sandberg, 2008). While some
changes no doubt enable well-being enhancement in the sense of
getting more of something that was limited in the past because
of its cost, there are likely other domains in which something
has lost importance today. For example, fight-or-flight reactions
that would have served well in an environment flush with preda-
tors might today contribute more to stress, cardiovascular disease,
and problems with anxiety (Bracha and Maser, 2008). Anti-
parasite immune cells can become overactive in our relatively
clean environment, triggering allergies (Sironi and Clerici, 2010).
And ancient hunger drives can lead to obesity in today’s societies,
given the unprecedented availability of low-nutrient, high-calorie
foods (e.g., Serlie et al., 2011). These examples provide further
potential cases in which we might judiciously diminish our body’s
natural responses in order to improve our overall well-being.
CONCLUSION
Our aim in this article has been simple. It has been to rethink,
or at least to problematize, the chiefly “augmentative” flavor of
discourse surrounding neurotechnological enhancement. We do
not mean to imply, of course, that all or even most of the dimin-
ishments we have discussed are currently technologically feasible,
nor do we suggest that they would always be the best solution to
the problem at hand. As Levy (2012) has recently argued, when
faced with a detrimental mismatch between our capacities and
our context, it is often better to change our environmental condi-
tions than it is to re-tool our biology, all things considered. Other
times, the best course of action might be to pursue a comple-
mentary strategy that involves the use of brain-level interventions
alongside other types of approaches (Savulescu and Sandberg,
2008). The answer is likely to be different for different cases.
Yet whatever position one takes on the proper balance of inter-
vention strategies, we have tried to show that there is something
to be gained by distinguishing functional enhancement from
enhancement of well-being. For any disposition, trait, or func-
tion, there is likely to be a discrete range of optimal levels (of
intensity, sensitivity, etc.) for the given set of conditions, and
too much or too little may detract from health or happiness.
Identifying diminishment as a possible form of human enhance-
ment, therefore, invites us to ask whether we may have too much
X for the best life, based on the relevant local circumstances and
other facets of modern living.
Another advantage of the welfarist definition of enhancement
is that it can handle not only cases of functional diminishment
(our emphasis in this paper), but even unusual cases includ-
ing extensions of the body, in which a new capacity is added
that did not exist before. One example of such a case is the
use of implanted magnets for “magnetic vision” (Larratt, 2004).
While this type of intervention is clearly “augmentative” (in the
sense of adding something rather than subtracting), it differs
from the usual augmentative cases—which involve intensifying
an existing capacity—in that it introduces a novel capacity that
would not exist at all without the enhancement. Similarly other
forms of body-modifications may be seen as attempts to enhance
well-being through bringing the body more in line with per-
sonal ideals of self-expression. These cases, too, may not involve
the “enhancement” of any existing capacity, but rather welfare
enhancement more broadly construed through the employment
of biotechnology.
We are careful to note that we have left untouched important
questions about who would administer these new technologies,
under what specific conditions; how their advisability would be
decided upon (especially as compared to other, potentially less
invasive, forms of intervention); how long their effects should
be expected to last; what risks or side-effects might be involved;
and whether any regulatory structures would have to be put in
place to accommodate their existence. These types of questions
are bound to overlap with analogous puzzles being worked out in
the “augmentative” enhancement literature, so we will leave their
discussion for another day. Here we have endeavored, not to cul-
tivate a vast procedural forest, but rather to plant a conceptual
seed.
FINAL THOUGHTS
As we have argued elsewhere (Savulescu et al., 2011), the
“enhancement debates” in biomedical ethics have been needlessly
encumbered by the existence of a hodge-podge of ill-defined,
poorly articulated notions of enhancement—often only implic-
itly communicated—along with endless to-ing and fro-ing about
the relationship between enhancement and the limits ofmedicine.
Re-casting “enhancement” as being essentially related to welfare,
however, provides several distinct advantages:
It ties enhancement to the value of well-being... It offers a gen-
eral framework for thinking about well-being. It offers more than
a mere list of value claims. It singles out well-being as one dimen-
sion of value that is constitutive of genuine human enhancement.
But it leaves open substantive and contentions questions about the
nature of well-being, and important empirical questions about the
impact of some treatment on well-being. [Moreover], the welfarist
approach distinguishes ways in which some treatment might ben-
efit a person from other relevant values, such as justice. It thus
allows us to say that although some treatment is an enhancement
(i.e., contributes to individuals’ well-being), it might neverthe-
less be bad overall, because its employment in the current social
context will lead to far greater injustice. (p. 7)
Finally, we note that people’s normal brain functions will dif-
fer across time and circumstance. They will differ between people
as well. We can now control function, at least in part, through the
use of neurotechnology and biomedicine, and our ability to do
so is likely to become increasingly more potent as well as more
targeted in the decades to come. We suggest that we should tie
this ability to a robust account of well-being (e.g., Kahane and
Savulescu, 2008; Earp et al., under review), and seek to maximize
function toward that end, whether the capacity itself is being aug-
mented (as is typically emphasized in these debates) or indeed (as
we emphasize here) effectively diminished.
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